Some Recent Developments in Wisconsin Income Taxation by Whyte, Malcolm K.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 4 June 1932 Article 2
Some Recent Developments in Wisconsin Income
Taxation
Malcolm K. Whyte
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Malcolm K. Whyte, Some Recent Developments in Wisconsin Income Taxation, 16 Marq. L. Rev. 234 (1932).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol16/iss4/2
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
WISCONSIN INCOME TAXATION
MALCOLm K. WHYTE*
T HERE is probably no field of law where development and change
is as rapid as in the field of income taxation. Legislative enact-
ments completely revamping existing income tax acts come with de-
pressing frequency as expressions of the constant change in economic
conditions and of the varying political conceptions of the party which
happens to be in power. Courts interpreting these new and partially
experimental statutes necessarily have little precedent to guide them
and in sailing their uncharted courses frequently pilot their ships into
the most unexpected shoals. The three changes to which this article
is restricted-one legislative and two judicial-all occurred within the
last six months and it is believed are typical of the rapid change of
policy and interpretation to which our income tax laws are subject.
A so-called "unemployment relief income tax" was enacted by the
legislature and became effective as Chapter 29, Laws of the Special
Session of 1931, on February 8, 1932. It provided for a special and
additional tax on 1931 incomes of individuals at the same rates as pro-
vided by the current state income tax act, but to increase the tax base
two innovations were introduced. First, dividends from Wisconsin
corporations were not exempted for the first time in our tax history
and, second, both gains and losses on the sales of securities, real estate
or other property were to be excluded in measuring net income.
The latter provision raises an interesting constitutional question.
Let us assume that A in 1931 purchased with his entire savings $15,-
000 worth of stock, borrowing $5,000 from his bank to make up the
needed fund. Let us further assume that A had a salary during the
year of $5,000 and that before the year was over his stock became
worthless and was sold. His net loss as ordinarily and as heretofore
computed would be $10,000, but under the new law he would be taxed
on his $5,000 salary as income, notwithstanding that the net result of
his year's operations was to wipe out his entire estate and leave him
insolvent to the extent of $5,000. Does Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, which authorizes progressive taxes on incomes,
permit the legislature to define income so as to include only certain
profits and to exclude certain losses and thus arrive at a taxable income
as variant from the real facts as in the above example?
The United States Supreme Court has several times stated "that
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which is not in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made such by
calling it income." (See Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206
[2151). In view of the large sums involved, the question will almost
certainly be presented to the courts.
Other provisions of the new act require the distribution of the
proceeds to the various counties, cities, towns and villages of the state
to be used for outdoor relief and any portions not used are to be ap-
plied to a reduction of the general property taxes of the municipal
corporation concerned for 1933. There is certainly considerable doubt
as to whether this use of state raised taxes to defray county or city
expenses can be justified under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion which provides that "The legislature shall provide for an annual
tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for each
year."
An interesting milestone in the development both of income tax
law and the emancipation of women is the United States Supreme
Court decision of Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 248 U.S. 206, (Nov.
30, 1931) reversing the decision of our Supreme Court found in 202
Wis. 493, 233 N.W. 100. Section 71.05 (2) (d) of our statutes had
required the computing together of the husband's, wife's and children's
income in any family for the purpose of rates and exemptions, thus
throwing more income into higher brackets than if they were computed
separately. The United States Supreme Court took the view that since
under our Wisconsin Married Women Acts the husband has no right
to or control over the wife's income, to use her income to affect the
rates for his tax is "to measure his tax, not by his own income, but
by that of another" and that to so do "is contrary to due process as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Justice Brandeis and
Stone concurred in a very characteristic dissenting opinion written by
Justice Holmes who felt that the legislature could properly consider
that while the husband no longer had command over the wife's income,
her income in fact would "make his life easier and help to pay his
bills."
A decision of more general scope, and which has caused consider-
able consternation in the ranks of tax practitioners is the decision of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Whitbeck v. Tax Commission, (Dec.
1931), 239 N.W. 655, rehearing opinion (Feb. 1932), 240 N.W. 804.
The United States Supreme Court in Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S.
142, 48 S. Ct. 463, had held that patent royalties were not subject to
state income tax. Accordingly, the plaintiff, who had reported certain
copyright royalties on his income tax return and had paid a tax on
them, filed a claim for refund, following the statutory procedure ap-
plicable to refunds, and the same procedure which had been followed
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in a number of other refund cases where taxpayers had prevailed in
the Supreme Court without question as to the technical prerequisites
of the refund claim being raised.
The statutory procedure requires the taxpayer to file a refund
claim within the statutory period with the Assessor of Incomes (or
with the Tax Commission in the case of corporations) and if the claim
be denied, prosecute an appeal to the Circuit Court after hearing before
the County Board of Review and the Tax Commission under Section
71.16 of the statutes. This procedure entailed administrative action on
the claim prior to court review and seemed thus to follow the general
scheme of the statutes.
In the Whitbeck case the court, however, for the first time directed
its attention to a provision of 71.17 (5) which by an obscure reference
to Section 71.14 seemed to make an appearance by the taxpayer before
the income tax board of review within twenty days after the income
tax in question is assessed a prerequisite to a refund of the erroneously
reported and assessed tax. On rehearing it was urged on the court that
as income taxes based on March 15th returns are assessed by June 1st,
and the Board of Reviews does not meet until the last Monday of July,
the procedure was not applicable and could not have been intended by
the legislature to govern refund cases. On rehearing, however, the
court not only stood its ground, but went a step further holding that as
a result of its conclusion a taxpayer who had erroneously reported
income on his return "has no right to a court review to correct that
error" and that in filing his return there is imposed on
"the taxpayer the duty of correctly assessing himself at his peril. In
case he does overtax himself his only remedy is that provided by sub-
sections (5) and (6) of Section 71.10 and by filing a claim for refund.
Section 71.17(5) If the reviewing authority refuses to certify any over-
payment, the taxpayer is without other remedy."
Thus the court has apparently completely abrogated legally enforce-
able refund claims for erroneously reported income and in interpreting
the letter of the refund statute has pretty well done the statute itself
to death. If a citizen erroneously reports too little income, the state
can correct the error and enforce the collection, but if the citizen erron-
eously reports too much, he is without court relief. Such an anomaly
is shocking to ones sense of justice.
That the statute contemplated that in making a return there was
imposed upon the taxpayer the duty of "assessing himself at his peril"
seems a conclusion hardly warranted by an examination of the statutes
themselves particularly considering the purposes of a refund. A pro-
vision for refund is granted taxpayers to permit them, within a certain
statutory period, to recover taxes erroneously reported. Everyone
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knows that questions as to whether certain expenditures are capital or
income, whether, if income, they are taxable, or whether the particular
income is applicable to one calendar year or another, are questions that
no taxpayer can in fairness be expected to know at the time of pre-
paring his return. In fact, subsequent events, not known at the time of
the return, often establish that particular items returned by a taxpayer
were not in fact income although believed by all concerned to be in-
come at the time reported. For these reasons the legislature incorpo-
rated a refund provision in the statutes with a court review.
Returns are made on forms provided by the state. The taxpayer is
required to fill out the forms fully or be subject to penalties. Now to
hold that in giving the state in good faith the information demanded
of him he is assessing himself and waiving his legal remedies in case
of error, seems to be a result entirely inconsistent with the very object
of a refund statute. The statement of the court that "an objection to
an assessment is one thing and an objection to a tax levied pursuant
thereto is another" would seem to indicate that the court in interpreting
these provisions confused the principles of real estate and income taxa-
tion as it is difficult to see what the comment of the court can mean as
applied to income taxes.
A more disturbing and fundamental consequence of the decision is
to give to the Tax Commission an unreviewable discretion over re-
funds. If the words of the decision are to be taken at their face value,
they mean that the Tax Commission can grant a refund to Smith and
deny it to Jones on the same set of facts, or grant it to its friends and
deny it to its enemies, or grant it to Republicans and deny it to Demo-
crats or vice versa, without any court review being available for the
rejected claimant. The vesting of such arbitrary and unbridled power
in an administrative commission is certainly foreign to all our usual
conceptions of administrative action and seems to authorize policy of
administrative tyranny contrary to our traditional government of law
and not of men.
The decision is the more surprising coming from a court which has
hitherto taken an energetic position against the ever growing encroach-
ment of commission and bureaucratic government. It is earnestly to be
hoped that either the legislature will, by prompt enactment, restore to
taxpayers a workable refund statute with a court review or that the
court itself will modify its pronouncement in the next case coming
before it.
